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 NOTE 
Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to 
Frozen Embryo Disputes 
Anna El-Zein* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How can two cells – a sperm and an egg – generate so many issues?  Con-
sider this example: a couple has difficulty bearing children without medical 
assistance,1 so they embark on the journey of in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).  
IVF, one of many forms of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”),2 is a 
fertilization process wherein an egg and sperm cell are manually combined and 
implanted into the uterus of a female donor or surrogate.3  After visiting a fer-
tility clinic,4 the couple decides to proceed with IVF and to cryopreserve, or 
 
* B.A., Truman State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2018; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would 
like to extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Paul Litton and the entire Missouri 
Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Couples dealing with fertility issues are not uncommon.  Of women aged fif-
teen to forty-four, over ten percent have received fertility services at some point in their 
lives.  See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATES REPORT 3 (2015), 
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf. 
 2. See In Vitro Fertilization: IFV, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://americanpreg-
nancy.org/infertility/in-vitro-fertilization/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
 3. Id. 
 4. In 2014, there were 458 reporting fertility clinics in the United States that per-
formed ART procedures.   See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 
1, at 4. 
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freeze, unused embryos5 to ease the IVF process should they attempt procrea-
tion again in the future.6  Generally, the fertility clinic asks the couple to sign 
a contract – called a cryopreservation consent form – to determine the fate of 
their embryos in case of death, divorce, or other change in circumstance.7 
Sometimes situations do change, and it is at this critical juncture – when 
donors have established their embryos’ destiny but circumstances are not pro-
vided for via contract – where disputes arise and the law crumbles.8  Suppose 
a couple divorces and the woman wants to implant the embryos against the 
man’s wishes; should a court be allowed to make that type of decision?  Alter-
natively, should a court be permitted to order disposal of the embryos or have 
the power to force the couple to give the embryos to research?  Should a court 
deem the frozen embryos “life” or “persons,” and if so, determine whether they 
have protectable constitutional rights?9  To date, only a handful of states have 
 
 5. This Note will use the term “embryo” to simplify the more precise term of 
“pre-embryo.”  For a brief scientific background, and an interesting moral discussion, 
see Howard W. Jones, Jr. & Charlotte Schrader, And Just What Is a Pre-Em-
bryo?, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 189 (1989) (available at http://www.fertstert.org/ar-
ticle/S0015-0282(16)60840-3/pdf).  A “pre-embryo” is generally considered a ferti-
lized egg within fourteen days of fertilization.  Id. at 189.  Before these fourteen days 
are completed, the pre-embryo lacks “the appearance of a single primitive streak” 
which establishes the group of cells as an individual human.  Id. at 190.  Before this 
time, the pre-embryo could still become twins or may not develop at all.  Id.  The term 
“embryo” in this Note will be used to encompass all forms of in vitro (taking place 
outside a living organism) pre-embryos prior to implantation in the uterus. 
 6. John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 408 (1990).  Cryopreservation allows embryos to be preserved for 
many years.  See How Do Embryos Survive the Freezing Process?, SCI. AM., 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-do-embryos-survive-th/ (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2017).  In cases where the donor and embryo carrier are the same woman, 
freezing embryos also will “relieve the woman of the physical burden and costs of un-
dergoing ovarian stimulation and egg retrieval during later attempts at IVF pregnancy.”  
Robertson, supra.  Further, cryopreservation enhances “the chances of pregnancy in 
later cycles since thawed embryos will be placed in the woman during a natural cycle, 
free of the stimulating drugs and surgical intrusion.”  Robertson, supra; see also How 
Do Embryos Survive the Freezing Process?, supra. 
 7. A cryopreservation agreement is a contract offered by fertility clinics desig-
nating the terms and agreement between a couple and the fertility clinic.  Robertson, 
supra note 6, at 409–10.  The form also allows couples to provide for the embryos’ 
disposition in the event of death, divorce, or other change in circumstance.  Id. at 410.  
For example, common embryo dispositions include donating the embryos to research, 
discarding the embryos, donating embryos to infertile couples, or awarding embryos to 
one of the parties.  Id. 
 8. See Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An 
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 56 
(1999). 
 9. Most courts have refused to recognize, or even address, whether frozen em-
bryos are life.  See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (“It 
is not necessary for this court to engage in a legal, medical or philosophical discussion 
2
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addressed the issue of frozen embryo disposition,10 and fewer states have en-
acted legislation to help courts navigate questions of the protectable interests 
of embryos, contract interpretation in this setting, and constitutional procrea-
tion rights.11 
In Part II, this Note addresses the general background of domestic and 
international case law and legislation surrounding embryonic disputes.  Part III 
then examines recent case law developments; specifically, it discusses the only 
existing frozen embryo dispute in Missouri.12  Finally, Part IV offers a sug-
gested approach for courts to use when addressing these increasingly complex 
cases. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although a relatively new concern, frozen embryo disputes have gener-
ated a sizeable amount of case law outside of Missouri.  Section A of this Part 
discusses the various approaches state courts use in determining the appropri-
ate disposition of frozen embryos when a couple divorces or separates.  Section 
B then discusses the few state statutes that bind courts when navigating embry-
onic disputes.  Finally, Section C addresses scholars’ recommendations, as well 
as international methods for avoiding frozen embryo disputes. 
 
whether the preembryos in this case are ‘children . . . .’”).  But see Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (“We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly speak-
ing, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to 
special respect because of their potential for human life.”); Jones & Schrader, supra 
note 5, at 191 (“[T]he pre-embryo deserves to be treated as a special bit of humanity . . 
. [but] it cannot have the moral equivalent of an adult . . . . This requires the establish-
ment of special rules for its place in society.  This niche is different from those of the 
egg, sperm and the fertilizing egg on the one hand and from the niches of the embryo, 
fetus, and infant on the other.”). 
 10. Courts have generally used the term “disposition” to encompass the fate of an 
embryo after an event provided for by contract, such as death, divorce, or separation.  
See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.  The list of states that have addressed frozen embryo 
disposition includes, at least: Illinois in Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1154 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015); Massachusetts in A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Mass. 
2000); Missouri in McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); New 
Jersey in J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 720 (N.J. 2001); New York in Kass v. Kass, 696 
N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998); Oregon in In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 
834, 840–41 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Pennsylvania in Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1137 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); Tennessee in Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; Texas in Roman v. Ro-
man, 193 S.W.3d 40, 49–50 (Tex. App. 2006); and Washington in Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 
269. 
 11. See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9) (2016); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2017). 
 12. See McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 127. 
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A. Methods State Courts Use to Determine Frozen Embryo Disposition 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address issues arising out of 
IVF procreation.13  Without explicit direction, state courts are left to decide 
these complex issues, dealing with their citizens’ most private concerns, on 
their own.  Most courts have taken one of three approaches: the balancing in-
terests approach, the contractual approach, or the contemporaneous mutual as-
sent approach.14 
1.  The Balancing Interests Approach 
The balancing interests approach seeks to resolve embryonic disputes by 
“consider[ing] the positions of the parties, the significance of their interests, 
and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing resolutions.”15 
In 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court became the first major appellate 
court to consider embryo disposition issues.16  In Davis v. Davis, a divorced 
couple disputed the custody of their frozen embryos.17  Without any type of 
agreement or consent form completed during the IVF process, the court was 
left to “weigh the interests of each party to the dispute . . . in order to resolve 
that dispute in a fair and responsible manner.”18  The woman wanted to donate 
the embryos to another couple, while the man opposed donation and wished to 
discard the embryos.19 
The court held that disputes over the disposition of embryos should honor 
the parties’ wishes.20  However, if no agreement memorializing the parties’ 
wishes exists (as was the case here), the court should weigh the interests of the 
parties.21  Balancing the parties’ interests, the court found the man’s interest in 
preventing the birth of embryos created from his sperm outweighed the 
woman’s interest in donating the embryos.22  Where a woman has a reasonable 
alternative to achieving parenthood, as the court found was the case here,23 the 
court concluded “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail.”24  The 
 
 13. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. 
 14. See Coleman, supra note 8, at 57–58. 
 15. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603. 
 16. Id. at 590 (“[W]e have no statutory authority or common law precedents to 
guide us . . . .”). 
 17. See id. at 592. 
 18. Id. at 591–92 (“There was no discussion, let alone an agreement, concerning 
disposition in the event of a contingency such as divorce.”). 
 19. Id. at 604. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (“The case would be closer if [the woman] were seeking to use the 
preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other reason-
able means.”). 
 24. Id. 
4
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court ruled in favor of the man, and the fertility clinic proceeded with its pro-
tocol for unused embryos.25 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Reber v. Reiss also used the bal-
ancing interests approach but reached a different outcome than did the Davis 
court.26  In Reber, a man appealed a Pennsylvania trial court’s decision, which 
awarded embryos to his cancer-ridden ex-wife.27  As in Davis, the couple in 
Reber had not signed a consent form prior to the IVF procedures.28  Applying 
the balancing interests approach, the court found that the woman’s compelling 
interest in using the embryos for “what is likely her only chance at genetic 
parenthood” outweighed the man’s interests in not procreating.29  Conse-
quently, the court awarded the embryos to the woman.30 
Unlike the previously mentioned frozen embryo disputes, J.B. v. M.B. in-
volved a man seeking ownership of the couples’ embryos so that he could im-
plant the embryos into a surrogate or donate them to another couple.31  The 
woman, though, wanted to discard the frozen embryos after the couple di-
vorced.32  Although the couple had entered into an agreement before proceed-
ing with IVF procedures, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that enforc-
ing contracts to enter or terminate familial relations violates New Jersey public 
policy.33  Accordingly, the court did not look to the couple’s agreement to de-
termine the disposition of the frozen embryos.34  Instead, the court balanced 
the interests of the parties and ultimately found the woman’s interest in not 
procreating outweighed the man’s interest in procreating because he was “able 
to become a father to additional children, whether through natural procreation 
or further in vitro fertilization.”35 
In sum, courts using the balancing approach disregard existing contracts 
and instead weigh one party’s interest in having a child against the burden to 
the other of unwillingly becoming a parent.36  The courts have typically not 
 
 25. If frozen embryos remain unused, a fertility clinic will usually discard the em-
bryos after a certain period of time.  See id. at 604–05. 
 26. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 27. Id. at 1133–34. 
 28. Id. at 1136. 
 29. Id. at 1140, 1142. 
 30. Id. at 1142. 
 31. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 717–20 (“The public policy concerns that underlie limitations on con-
tracts involving family relationships are protected by permitting either party to object 
at a later date to provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that that party no 
longer accepts.”). 
 34. Id. at 719–20. 
 35. Id. at 717. 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 719 (recognizing that “persuasive reasons exist for enforcing 
preembryo disposition agreements” but concluding that “if there is disagreement as to 
disposition because one party has reconsidered his or her earlier decision, the interests 
of both parties must be evaluated”). 
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allowed one party to force another to become a parent, with one exception.37  
Courts have allowed parties to use frozen embryos against their counterpart’s 
wishes when a woman lacks the ability to have children without the use of the 
embryos.38 
2.  The Contractual Approach 
Courts using the contractual approach generally presume that an agree-
ment made between the parties at the time of IVF is valid and enforceable.39  
This approach attempts to avoid costly litigation and leaves such private deci-
sions to the interested parties rather than the courts.40 
In Kass v. Kass, the New York Court of Appeals applied the contractual 
approach to determine whether a cryopreservation agreement between a man 
and woman should be enforced.41  The parties agreed that if they were unable 
to reach a mutually-satisfactory decision as to the disposition of the embryos, 
the embryos would be given to an IVF program for research.42  The couple 
divorced, and despite this agreement, the lower court granted custody of the 
embryos to the woman, reasoning that “a female participant in the IVF proce-
dure has exclusive decisional authority over the fertilized eggs created through 
that process, just as a pregnant woman has exclusive decisional authority over 
a nonviable fetus.”43  However, the state’s highest court found the parties “un-
equivocally manifest[ed] their mutual intention that . . . the pre-zygotes be do-
nated for research to the IVF program” and ultimately honored the parties’ 
original contract.44 
In Litowitz v. Litowitz, a husband and wife signed a cryopreservation con-
sent form that stated “[i]n the event [the Litowitzes] are unable to reach a mu-
tual decision regarding the disposition of [their] pre-embryos, [they] must pe-
tition to a [c]ourt of competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the ap-
propriate disposition of [their] pre-embryos.”45  Upon divorcing, the man 
 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 717; Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(recognizing the principle and applying its single exception); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing the impact of “unwanted parenthood” 
on a party). 
 38. Reber, 42 A.3d at 1142. 
 39. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
 40. Id.; Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 41. Kass, 696 N.E.2d. at 180–82. 
 42. Id. at 176–77. 
 43. Id. at 177. 
 44. Id. at 181; accord In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2008) (“We conclude that the general framework set forth by the courts in Davis 
and Kass, in which courts give effect to the progenitors’ intent by enforcing the pro-
genitors’ advance directive regarding the embryos, is persuasive.”).  The Kass court 
uses the term “pre-zygotes” which it defines as “eggs which have been penetrated by 
sperm but have not yet joined genetic material.”  Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 n.1. 
 45. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 263 (Wash. 2002) (en banc). 
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wished to place the embryos up for adoption, while the woman hoped to im-
plant the embryos inside her to pursue pregnancy.46  Yet, neither party was 
satisfied because the Washington Supreme Court honored a provision in the 
couple’s contract that stated the eggs were to be thawed out (and eventually 
destroyed) but not allowed to be further developed after the pre-embryos had 
been in cryopreservation for five years.47 
Most recently, in Szafranski v. Dunston, the Illinois Appellate Court used 
the contractual approach where an ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend were fighting 
over their frozen embryos.48  After the couple’s separation,49 the woman hoped 
to implant the embryos within her.50  She argued that in the event of separation, 
the contract previously entered into by the parties gave her full custody of the 
embryos.51  In the alternative, she asked the court to balance the parties’ inter-
ests and award her custody.52  Meanwhile, the man asserted his right not to 
procreate and requested the court prevent her from implanting the embryos.53 
Ultimately, the court in Szafranski held the dispute should be settled by 
“honoring any advance agreement entered into by the parties” but agreed to use 
the balancing interests approach if no agreement existed.54  Applying this 
framework, the court ignored the written consent form, which stated it would 
take no action without the parties’ mutual consent, and found the couple had 
previously entered into an oral contract.55  The court awarded the woman sole 
custody and use of the embryos.56  The court also acknowledged that, even in 
 
 46. Id. at 264. 
 47. Id. at 271.  Five years had passed during the course of the litigation, but the 
contract was not amended during that time.  See id. at 268–69.  But see id. at 273 (Sand-
ers, J., dissenting) (“That by today more than five years has passed since the cryopres-
ervation commenced is irrelevant because the judicial action which provided for the 
disposition of the preembryos was commenced well within the five-year window 
thereby tolling the contracted period of limitations.”). 
 48. Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1136 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015). 
 49. Id. at 1140 (“Jacob ended their relationship in a text message.”). 
 50. Id. at 1136; see also Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 505 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2013) (“Appellee attached to her motion a letter from [a doctor] stating that appellee 
has ovarian failure as a result of her chemotherapy treatment which has ‘rendered [her] 
unable to conceive a child with the use of her own oocytes.’” (second alteration in 
original)). 
 51. Szafranski, 34 N.E.3d at 1137. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 1147. 
 55. Id. at 1138, 1151–52 (“Karla told Jacob that the plan was to retrieve a large 
number of eggs, fertilize a portion, and then freeze the resulting pre-embryos while she 
underwent her chemotherapy treatment.  Karla asked if he would ‘be willing to provide 
sperm to make pre-embryos with her.’  He responded ‘yes,’ telling Karla that he wanted 
to help her have a child.”). 
 56. Id. at 1137. 
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the absence of an oral or written contract, the court would have still found for 
the woman under the balancing interests test.57 
3.  The Contemporaneous Mutual Consent Approach 
The contemporaneous mutual consent approach suggests “no embryo 
should be used by either partner, donated to another patient, used in research, 
or destroyed without the [contemporaneous] mutual consent of the couple that 
created the embryo.”58  In practice, this approach allows the parties to create a 
contract and modify that agreement with both parties’ consent.59  Both parties 
must agree before a court will allow either party to use embryos.   
In A.Z. v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered the 
disposition of embryos created by a couple who signed a consent form desig-
nating the embryos to the woman for implantation in the event the couple be-
came “separated.”60  Unlike previous decisions, A.Z. looked to the intention of 
the consent form, which the court found to merely “define the donors’ relation-
ship as a unit with the clinic.”61  The court further devalued the consent form 
because it lacked a durational provision, and the term “separation” was legally 
distinct from “divorce.”62 
For these reasons, the court in A.Z. refused to honor the parties’ IVF con-
sent form.63  The court also stated that even if the consent form were legally 
sufficient, it would not be enforced for public policy reasons.64  It found that 
agreements to enter into marriage or parenthood “should not be enforced 
against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions” – here, the 
man, who now objected to the woman’s use of the embryos.65  Instead, in order 
for one of the parties to use the embryos over the objection of the other, the 
court required contemporaneous mutual consent.66  Stated differently, because 
the woman wanted to use the parties’ embryos but her partner now objected, 
 
 57. Id. at 1137, 1147 (“Karla’s desire to have a biological child in the face of the 
impossibility of having one without using the embryos, outweighs Jacob’s privacy con-
cerns . . . and his speculative concern that he might not find love with a woman because 
he unhesitatingly agreed to help give Karla her last opportunity to fulfill her wish to 
have a biological child.”). 
 58. Coleman, supra note 8, at 110; see also Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 
502, 510 (Ill. Ct. App. 2013) (exemplifying the issues of contractual assent). 
 59. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 60. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (Mass. 2000). 
 61. Id. at 1056. 
 62. Id. at 1057. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1057–58 (“As a matter of public policy, we conclude that forced procre-
ation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement.”). 
 65. Id. at 1059. 
 66. Id.; see Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition and Divorce: Why Clinic 
Consent Forms Are Not the Answer, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 57, 59 (2011). 
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the woman would need to change her  partner’s mind before she would be en-
titled to use the embryos.  Because mutual consent did not exist, the court re-
fused to allow the woman to implant the frozen embryos against the man’s 
wishes.67 
Although these three methods of resolving the disposition of frozen em-
bryos have given courts guidance, some states have enacted legislation to pre-
vent litigation from reaching the courts. 
B. State Legislation Addressing Frozen Embryos 
Although no Missouri statute directly addresses embryonic disputes, two 
Missouri statutes attempt to define the point at which “life” begins.  Section 
1.205 of the Missouri Revised Statutes notes, “[L]ife of each human being be-
gins at conception.”68  It continues, “[T]he term ‘unborn children’ or ‘unborn 
child’ shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human be-
ings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological de-
velopment.”69  In addition, section 188.015 reiterates that life begins “from the 
moment of conception until birth and at every stage of its biological develop-
ment, including . . . embryo[s].”70  This language suggests that an embryo, as 
the fruit of conception, is life with protectable interests.71  Yet, ambiguity re-
mains because the statutes repeatedly reference “biological development,” and 
freezing an embryo likely halts its biological development. 
Other states have gone further.  In anticipating complex legal issues sur-
rounding embryonic disputes, some states have created statutes that attempt to 
define “embryo” or that direct those couples who go through IVF procedures 
to take appropriate action in order to prevent later disputes.72  In Florida, a 
couple seeking cryopreservation of embryos “shall enter into a written agree-
ment that provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s . . . 
preembryos in the event of a divorce, the death of a spouse, or any other un-
foreseen circumstance.”73  If no agreement exists, Florida has designated that 
 
 67. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059. 
 68. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205(1) (2016) (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. at § 1.205(3) (bold in original) (emphasis added). 
 70. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9) (2016) (emphasis added).  Section (10) contin-
ues, “‘Viability’ ‘or ‘viable’, that stage of fetal development when the life of the un-
born child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems.”  Id. at § 188.015(10) (bold in original). 
 71. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 1.205(1)(2) (2016) (“Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, 
and well-being . . . .”); see also Brief for Appellant at 1, McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 
S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (No. ED103138), 2015 WL 9582009, at *1 (arguing 
same).  In addition, an embryo that is deemed life will receive legal protection through 
an appointed guardian ad litem.  MO. REV. STAT. § 452.423(1) (2016). 
 72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017). 
 73. § 742.17. 
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decision-making authority should “reside jointly with the . . . couple.”74  Flor-
ida’s statute effectively acts as a method of contemporaneous mutual consent 
because it encourages couples to enter into a pre-agreement and does not allow 
one party to act unilaterally.75 
The New Hampshire legislature enacted a bill mandating that, before an 
embryonic transfer procedure, the potential parents must “make guardianship 
provisions for the prospective child by amending their existing estate planning 
documents, or by executing estate planning documents . . . if they have no ex-
isting estate planning documents.”76  Further, couples must go through medical 
examinations and counseling before embryonic transfer.77  This law encour-
ages parties to plan for the future of their prospective child. 
In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute designating that “[a] ‘human embryo’ 
. . . is an in vitro fertilized human ovum, with certain rights granted by law, 
composed of one or more living human cells and human genetic material so 
unified and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn child.”78  
Courts interpret this statute to mean that an embryo is a “juridical person” that 
must be implanted and cannot be discarded.79 
C. International Methods and Alternative Approaches 
The United States is not alone in dealing with frozen embryo disputes.  
Across the globe, Italy was once considered the “Wild West” of alternative 
reproduction technologies.80  Italian doctors dabbled in cloning, race selection, 
and IVF treatment on women well-beyond childbearing age.81  In 2004, Italy 
passed the Regulation of Medically Assisted Reproduction law, largely in re-
sponse to religious pressure.82  The law shifted the country from a “completely 
 
 74. § 742.17(2). 
 75. § 742.17. 
 76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (2017). 
 77. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (interpreting New Hamp-
shire statutes to require couples to “undergo medical exams and counseling”); see also 
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000) (same); Roman v. Roman, 193 
S.W.3d 40, 44 n.6 (Tex. App. 2006) (same). 
 78. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:121 (2017). 
 79. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055; Roman, 193 S.W.3d at 44 
n.6; In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 841 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).  A 
“juridical person” is an entity that is not a natural person but has legal rights and obli-
gations recognized by the law.  What Is a Juridical Person?, L. DICTIONARY, 
http://thelawdictionary.org/juridical-person/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
 80. Morgan De Ann Shields, Comment, Which Came First the Cost or the Em-
bryo? An Economic Argument for Disallowing Cryopreservation of Human Embryos, 
9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 685, 712 (2013). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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unregulated IVF regime to [having] some of the harshest restrictions world-
wide.”83  The law prohibits the freezing of embryos, allows only three embryos 
to be fertilized and implanted at a time, and forbids posthumous IVF treat-
ment.84  Proponents of the law claim it is an effective means of protecting 
women from risky procedures and potential health risks associated with multi-
ple pregnancies.85  However, opponents of the law argue it effectively halts 
scientific development, promotes “infertility tourism” to neighboring coun-
tries, and “assign[s] a higher value to protection of embryos than to the interests 
of infertile women.”86 
In response to historical Nazi abuse, Germany passed The Embryo Pro-
tection Act of 1990 to protect against “violations of humanity.”87  While cou-
ples are still permitted to participate in IVF treatments, the act heavily regulates 
the creation, preservation, and destruction of embryos.88  The act prescribes 
only three embryos may be created and implanted at one time, prohibits post-
humous procreation, and bars embryonic cryopreservation.89  Such limitations 
were designed to prevent the recurrence of medical abuses undertaken during 
the Nazi era, as well as to protect women from multiple gestations and accom-
panying pregnancy complications.90  In a sense, the act attempts to balance the 
 
 83. Id. (“Before this Law was passed, Italy had the most unregulated ART industry 
in Europe.”). 
 84. Id.; Mary Rodgers Bundren, The Influence of Catholicism, Islam and Judaism 
on the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (“Art”) Bioethical and Legal Debate: A 
Comparative Survey of Art in Italy, Egypt and Israel, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 715, 
732 (2007). 
 85. See Bundren, supra note 84, at 730–33. 
 86. Id. at 733 (“Because abortion is still legal in Italy, aborting a fetus at sixteen-
weeks gestation is tolerated; however, dropping an embryo culture dish in the labora-
tory may be considered homicide.”).  The term “infertility tourism” refers to travel due 
to differences in cost, decreased administrative barriers, or other treatments prohibited 
by a person’s own country.  Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tour-
ists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 303–04 (2005). 
 87. Shields, supra note 80, at 709–10 (quoting Tanja Krones, The Scope of the 
Recent Bioethics Debate in Germany: Kant, Crisis, and No Confidence in Society, 15 
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 273, 277 (2006)).  Shields writes, 
 
Germans[] have, due to our history of Nazi Germany, a high sensitivity and fear 
of making horrible mistakes again.  Therefore, we have to be exceedingly sus-
picious and cautious with regard to developments that might have the potential 
for violating human dignity in our society Only strict legislation, such as the 
E[mbryo] P[rotection] A[ct], rooted in our Constitution, offers protection 
against violations of humanity. 
 
Id. at 710 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Krones, supra, at 
710). 
 88. Id. at 709. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 710; John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the 
United States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
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woman’s interest in having a child with the state’s interest in preventing mul-
tiple gestations for its citizens.91 
One scholar has argued that the United States should follow Italy and 
Germany by prohibiting cryopreservation of embryos altogether.92  By enact-
ing legislation that bans cryopreservation, litigation would subside, IVF proce-
dures would be standardized, and costs associated with IVF procedures and 
resulting births would be reduced.93  Regardless, litigation surrounding IVF 
and frozen embryo disputes presents difficult issues for courts across the coun-
try and worldwide.  The Missouri courts have avoided such controversies – 
until now.94 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Missouri, case law regarding embryonic disposition is scant.  However, 
in November 2016, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, addressed 
a dispute over frozen embryos in McQueen v. Gadberry.95  As a case of first 
impression, McQueen v. Gadberry will undoubtedly direct future litigation on 
artificial reproductive technologies and may pressure the Missouri legislature 
to enact legislation relating to these issues.  Part A of this section explains the 
relevant facts surrounding the dispute and each party’s arguments on appeal.  
Part B discusses the analysis and holding of McQueen v. Gadberry and its im-
plications for Missouri jurisprudence. 
A. Relevant Facts 
Jalesia McQueen and Justin Gadberry were married in September 2005.96  
In early 2007, while Gadberry was stationed at a North Carolina military base, 
four embryos were created after the couple underwent IVF procedures.97  Two 
of the embryos were successfully implanted, and McQueen eventually gave 
birth to twin boys.98  The other two embryos were frozen and remain in stor-
age.99  Later, the couple was forced to move their frozen embryos to another 
 
L. 189, 207 (2004) (“Pregnancies with two or more fetuses carry extra burdens and 
substantial health risks for both the woman and the offspring.”). 
 91. Robertson, supra note 90, at 206. 
 92. Shields, supra note 80, at 713. 
 93. Id. 
 94. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 133. 
 97. Id. at 133–34. 
 98. Id. at 134. 
 99. Id. 
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fertility clinic in Virginia, the Cryobank, at which point they signed an agree-
ment form regarding the disposition of the embryos.100  The form stated that in 
the event of divorce, the embryos would be “[u]sed by . . . McQueen.”101 
McQueen and Gadberry separated in September 2010.102  The dissolution 
of the couple’s marriage proceeded smoothly with one exception – custody of 
the two frozen embryos.103  Before the eventual trial, the court appointed a 
guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the frozen embryos, an interesting de-
velopment itself, as this implied the embryos had independent legal rights that 
required protection.104  Ultimately, the trial court awarded McQueen and Gad-
berry joint custody of the embryos, specifically prohibiting any transfer, re-
lease, or use of the frozen embryos without the signed authorization of both 
McQueen and Gadberry.105  McQueen appealed to the Missouri Court of Ap-
peals, Eastern District.106 
McQueen maintained three arguments on appeal.107  First, McQueen 
claimed Missouri law recognizes embryos, including frozen embryos, as chil-
dren complete with rights to “life, health and well-being.”108  Consequently, 
she sought “custody” of the frozen embryos.109  McQueen argued in the alter-
native that even if the frozen embryos were considered marital property, she 
should be awarded the embryos because the cryopreservation contract was 
valid and enforceable against Gadberry.110  Finally, McQueen claimed that the 
court-appointed GAL did not fulfill her legal duty to protect the embryos’ best 
interest.111 
Conversely, Gadberry argued that awarding McQueen the frozen em-
bryos would violate his constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection 
and his right not to procreate.112  Gadberry posited the trial court was correct 
in characterizing the frozen embryos as marital property and designating that 
 
 100. Id. at 135. 
 101. Id. at 153.  Although the specific contract provision is uncontested, Gadberry 
argued there was no discussion of the final disposition of the embryos and alleged the 
contract was completed outside of Gadberry’s presence.  Id. at 155. 
 102. Id. at 133. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (“[T]he trial court . . . apparently sua sponte, appointed a guardian ad litem 
(“GAL”) for the frozen pre-embryos.”). 
 105. Id. at 132. 
 106. Id. at 127. 
 107. Id. at 137. 
 108. Id. at 136 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2000)).  The court states, “Missouri 
law . . . recognizes an embryo is a person with protectable rights in life, health and well-
being from the moment of conception onward, unless such protection is barred by the 
U.S. Constitution and decisional interpretation thereof.”  Id. (citing § 1.205 (2000)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 136–37. 
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no transfer, release, or use of the embryos could occur unless the parties 
agreed.113 
B. The Court’s Analysis and Holdings 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, addressed two main is-
sues in its opinion.  First, the court discussed “[w]hether the legislature’s dec-
larations [that life begins at conception/fertilization] constitutionally apply to 
frozen pre-embryos and whether frozen pre-embryos should be considered 
‘children’ under Missouri’s [marriage] dissolution statutes.”114  Specifically, 
the court discussed whether section 1.205 of the Missouri Revised Statutes can 
be read in pari materia with Missouri’s statute for marriage dissolution.115  
Section 1.205 says, “The life of each human being begins at conception” and 
“the term ‘unborn children’ . . . shall include all unborn . . . children . . . from 
the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological develop-
ment.”116  Further, it states that “[u]nborn children have protectable interests in 
life, health, and well-being.”117  However, and crucial to the court’s decision, 
section 1.205 also notes that Missouri recognizes unborn children as persons 
with protectable interests “subject only to the Constitution of the United States, 
and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court.”118  
The court accordingly held that “Missouri Courts should read all Missouri stat-
utes in pari materia (harmoniously) with section 1.205 so long as such a read-
ing does not violate a party’s constitutional right afforded to . . . her by the U.S. 
Constitution and decisional interpretations thereof by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”119 
The court then gave various examples of Missouri case law in which sec-
tion 1.205 was constitutionally applied to other statutes, demonstrating that it 
could be read consistently with constitutional rights.120  For example, the court 
 
 113. See id. at 137. 
 114. Id. at 142. 
 115. Id.; see also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2016).  Statutes read in pari materia are 
generally on the same topic or subject matter and are construed together.  What Is In 
Pari Materia?, L. DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/in-pari-materia/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 8, 2017); Matthew Davis, Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. 
L. REV. 1127, 1139 (2016) (“Ambiguous statutory language should be read in light of 
separate statutes concerning the same subject matter, more commonly known as stat-
utes in pari materia.”). 
 116. § 1.205 (bold omitted).  McQueen also relied on section 188.015 to further 
define the term “unborn.”  McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 140; MO. REV. STAT. § 188.015(9) 
(2016) (“‘Unborn child’, the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception 
until birth and at every stage of its biological development, including the human con-
ceptus, zygote, morula, blastocyst, embryo, and fetus.”). 
 117. § 1.205.1(2). 
 118. § 1.205.2. 
 119. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 142. 
 120. See id. at 141–43. 
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noted section 1.205 has been applied to both civil and criminal statutes against 
third parties for allegedly causing the death of an unborn fetus.121  And, cases 
applying section 1.205 to other statutes have explicitly held that such an appli-
cation does not violate Supreme Court precedent – specifically, Roe v. Wade.122  
But, the court made a critical distinction: section 1.205 has only been constitu-
tionally applied to other statutes where an unborn fetus is in utero; it has never 
been applied where an unborn embryo is in vitro, as was the case here.123  With 
this in mind, the court proceeded to question whether reading section 1.205 
harmoniously with the Missouri marriage dissolution statues – or, recognizing 
in vitro embryos as persons – would violate either party’s constitutional 
rights.124 
The court used the balancing interests approach to weigh the rights and 
interests of McQueen and Gadberry.125  Before addressing the parties’ interests, 
the court reiterated that the case considers frozen embryos in vitro, so the issues 
presented “[do] not implicate McQueen’s right to bodily integrity in the area 
of reproductive choice under Roe [v. Wade] which would outweigh any of Gad-
berry’s interests in avoiding parenthood.”126  Instead, McQueen and Gadberry 
“must be seen as entirely equivalent gamete providers,” each with individual 
procreation rights.127 
Having determined that McQueen and Gadberry possessed equally-
vested rights, the court addressed the relative interests of the parties.128  The 
court found McQueen’s necessity to use the frozen embryos to be non-exist-
ent.129  The court noted that McQueen did not seek IVF due to fertility issues 
but because she and Gadberry were separated geographically.130  Moreover, 
McQueen had twin boys as a result of a successful IVF procedure and had 
 
 121. Id. at 141; State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d 663, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); Bailey 
v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 54–55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 122. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504–07 (1989); State v. Holcomb, 956 
S.W.2d 286, 289–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Rollen, 133 S.W.3d 57, 58–64 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2003); Bailey, 191 S.W.3d at 55. 
 123. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 141; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 120; Webster, 492 
U.S. at 504–07; Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 289–93; Rollen, 133 S.W.3d at 58–64; Bailey, 
191 S.W.3d at 53–54. 
 124. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 143. 
 125. Id. at 144.  The court first noted that it did not recognize the signed cryopres-
ervation agreement between McQueen and Gadberry as valid and enforceable, for rea-
sons explained below.  Id.  Because there was not an enforceable contract, the court 
used the balancing interests approach.  Id. 
 126. Id. at 145; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–54. 
 127. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144.  A “gamete” is “one of the cells that join to-
gether to begin making a person or other creature.”  Gamete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gamete (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). 
 128. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 145. 
 129. Id. at 145–46. 
 130. Id. at 146. 
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another child conceived “through traditional means.”131  The court did not find 
McQueen’s interests persuasive because her “fundamental right to procreate 
would [not] be irrevocably extinguished.”132  To the contrary, the court found 
Gadberry’s interests compelling.133  Gadberry did not want to have more chil-
dren with McQueen, so sustaining her appeal would have essentially made him 
a father against his wishes.134  Unlike McQueen’s rights – which were not ir-
revocably extinguished – if the frozen embryos were successfully implanted 
and brought to term, Gadberry’s right not to procreate would be irrevocably 
extinguished.135 
The court held that the legislature’s intention for embryos to be recog-
nized as persons, as stated in section 1.205, is simply “not sufficient to justify 
any infringement upon the freedom and privacy of Gadberry and McQueen to 
make their own intimate decisions.”136  In addition, the court held that applying 
section 1.205 to Missouri’s marriage dissolution statutes would be “contrary to 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution” and would 
violate Gadberry’s constitutional right to privacy, right against government in-
trusion, and right not to procreate.137  For these reasons, the court held that 
frozen embryos could not be considered “people” with protectable rights under 
the law.138 
The court next considered whether it was appropriate for the trial court to 
classify the frozen embryos as “marital property of a special character.”139  The 
 
 131. Id. at 145. 
 132. Id. at 146. 
 133. Id. at 147. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  In a lengthy and interesting footnote, the court explores potential difficul-
ties with recognizing frozen embryos as persons.  Id. at 147 n.21.  The court notes, 
 
[I]n the area of criminal law, gamete providers or fertility workers could 
possibly be charged with and convicted of various forms of murder and 
manslaughter, assault, or child abuse for intentionally or unintentionally 
destroying or “injuring” pre-embryos or frozen pre-embryos and for cryo-
genically preserving pre-embryos and placing them in long-term or indefi-
nite storage. . . . And in the area of civil law, (1) gamete providers or fertility 
workers could be sued for wrongful death for destroying pre-embryos or 
frozen pre-embryos; and (2) there could be potential problems with a couple 
or individuals donating pre-embryos or frozen pre-embryos to others be-
cause donation would arguably have to be governed by Missouri’s adoption 




 138. Id. at 147–48. 
 139. Id. at 148. 
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court began by noting that property, including marital property, embraces “ex-
ternal thing[s] over which the rights of [] use [] are exercised.”140  According 
to the court, frozen embryos are property because they are in vitro, which is 
external.141  However, the court recognized that frozen embryos are “special” 
and are “entitled to special respect” because they have the potential to become 
children.142  Indeed, the frozen embryos were given special respect when the 
trial court ordered that they remain cryogenically preserved and stored until the 
parties could agree to change the status quo.143  The court noted that this ruling 
showed respect because only McQueen and Gadberry should have determina-
tive decision-making authority.144  Consequently, the court held that frozen 
embryos are “marital property of a special character.”145 
Subsequently, the court addressed McQueen’s arguments in the alterna-
tive.146  McQueen argued that even if the frozen embryos are considered prop-
erty and not humans, she should be awarded the embryos because the cryopres-
ervation agreement, which was in her favor, was valid and enforceable.147  The 
court also addressed her claim that it was required to divide all marital property, 
including the frozen embryos, between McQueen and Gadberry instead of 
awarding them to the couple jointly.148 
To begin, the court noted that “[p]roperty acquired during the marriage is 
presumed to be marital property, but a party may overcome this presumption 
if . . . she shows the property is separate.”149  McQueen claimed that the frozen 
embryos could not be jointly owned by her and Gadberry because the embryos 
were deemed “separate” by the couple’s cryopreservation agreement.150  Be-
fore determining whether the property was “separate,” the court considered the 
preliminary question of whether the contract was entered into “freely, fairly, 
knowingly, understandingly, and in good faith with full disclosure.”151  The 
court eventually answered this question in the negative.152 
Supporting its conclusion, the court pointed to several key facts.153  First, 
the court highlighted conflicting testimony as to whether McQueen and Gad-
berry had discussed the potential disposition of their frozen embryos before 
 
 140. Id. (quoting Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 141. Id. at 148–49. 
 142. Id. at 149. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 151.  The couple’s cryopreservation contract designated that in the case 
of separation or divorce, the frozen embryos would be “[u]sed by Jalesia F. McQueen.”  
Id. at 153. 
 148. Id. at 156. 
 149. Id. at 151 (citing Thorp v. Thorp, 390 S.W.3d 871, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 151–52, 156. 
 152. Id. at 155–56. 
 153. Id. at 155. 
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signing the agreement.154  The court also found that Gadberry “did not sign the 
[contract] with the intent that McQueen be awarded the frozen pre-embryos in 
the event of a divorce.”155  Further, it recognized the designation that the frozen 
embryos would be “[u]sed by Jalesia F. McQueen” was handwritten in black 
ink next to the couple’s initials, which were in blue ink.156  The court found 
that this indicated the contract may have been “filled in after Gadberry initialed 
the page.”157  The court also noted that the page designating the embryos’ dis-
position was completed by McQueen and Gadberry six days after the last page 
of the agreement, the “signature page,” was signed and notarized.158  For these 
reasons, the court held that the contract was unenforceable and that there was 
not enough evidence to render the frozen embryos as “separate” property to be 
awarded to McQueen.159 
Next, the court gave no merit to McQueen’s claim that it was required to 
“divide” the frozen embryos and award them to either McQueen or Gad-
berry.160  Missouri precedent does not preclude courts from awarding marital 
property jointly under unusual circumstances, and McQueen and Gadberry’s 
circumstances were certainly unusual.161  The court also reiterated its previous 
holding that without mutual consent, the frozen embryos were not to be trans-
ferred, released, or used by either party precisely because this “subjects neither 
party to any unwarranted governmental intrusion but rather leaves the intimate 
decision of whether to potentially have more children to the parties alone.”162 
Finally, the court cast aside McQueen’s argument that the court-ap-
pointed GAL did not fulfill her legal duties to advocate for the interests of the 
frozen embryos because “support of children [was] not [a] contested issue[] in 
this case.”163  Having already established that frozen embryos are not consid-
ered persons, the issue of GAL intervention was effectively moot.164   
The court in McQueen v. Gadberry was the first to directly address the 
issue of whether frozen embryos are legal persons.165  Its analysis and implica-
tions are certain to be tested by other courts in the future.166  Next, Part IV 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 154 (alteration in original). 
 157. Id. at 155. 
 158. Id. at 154. 
 159. Id. at 156.  The court also held that Gadberry did not waive any or all of his 
rights to the frozen embryos.  Id. at 155. 
 160. Id. at 156–58. 
 161. Id. at 157. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 150. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 142. 
 166. Following the decision in McQueen v. Gadberry, House Bill 2558 was pro-
posed by the Missouri legislature but failed to become law.  The bill would have rec-
ognized in vitro human embryos as human beings with constitutional rights, directed 
the courts to award custody of the embryos based on the embryos’ “best interests,” and 
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tackles a different question – how can reproductive donors avoid litigating em-
bryonic disputes altogether? 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Case law gives rise to a hierarchy of priorities related to embryonic dis-
putes.  Courts generally prefer to honor these types of contracts unless a con-
tract allows one party to have a child against the other’s wishes.167  Sometimes 
courts disregard a contract and instead rule after balancing the parties’ rights 
or requiring the parties to agree.168  Courts have generally found that each do-
nor’s right not to procreate trumps a general interest in having children.169  Yet 
when a woman is found to have no other reasonable means of having children 
naturally, her right to reproduce typically supersedes the other’s right not to 
procreate.170  This Part argues that cryopreservation agreements should be re-
quired by state law and enforced by courts; but, because of the stakes involved, 
cryopreservation agreements should be presumed enforceable only when par-
ties consult with independent counsel before signing. 
A. Courts Should Honor Contracts to Recognize Couples’ Rights 
to Procreate (or Not to) 
IVF and other alternative forms of reproduction offer struggling couples 
opportunities to have children that they may not have otherwise.171  Given the 
private nature of procreation, couples should have the right to control their re-
production choices, and courts should recognize these rights by allowing par-
ties to designate embryonic disposition when certain events occur.172  In order 
to maximize a couples’ rights – and minimize the negative consequences of 
other approaches – courts should enforce contracts that represent a couples’ 
designations.173  Without a contract, courts run the risk of improperly 
 
created a presumption that the “best interests” of the embryos were for it to be devel-
oped to birth.  See H.B. 2558, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 167. See, e.g., Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); A.Z. 
v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
 168. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144. 
 169. Id. at 146–47. 
 170. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162 (Ill. Ct. App. 2015). 
 171. See Robertson, supra note 6, at 424.  Aside from IVF, other alternative forms 
of reproduction include artificial insemination, egg or sperm donation, use of a surro-
gate, zygote intrafallopian transfer, gamete intrafallopian transfer, or intracytoplasmic 
sperm injection.  See Infertility FAQs, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2017). 
 172. Robertson, supra note 6, at 424. 
 173. Sara D. Petersen, Comment, Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon Di-
vorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1065, 1082–83 (2003). 
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“valu[ing] the reproductive concerns of the persons involved” and imposing 
those values on a couple.174 
Unfortunately, enforcing a contract as written may mean that a party who 
changes his or her mind as to the disposition of the embryos is left unsatis-
fied.175  But, “[f]reedom to contract or to make directives binding in future 
situations enhances liberty even though it involves constraints on what may 
occur once the future situation comes about.”176  Enforcing contracts also “pro-
vides incentives for the [fertility] clinics themselves to proffer relevant infor-
mation and well-drafted consent forms that encourage their customers to plan 
carefully.”177  If couples realize their contract will be enforced, they are more 
likely to “make a thoughtful and informed decision regarding the disposition 
of their frozen embryos.”178  On the other hand, if courts inconsistently enforce 
agreements, there is little incentive for couples to think carefully about the fu-
ture disposition of their frozen embryos.179  Today’s environment encourages 
litigation, given there is little legislation in this field and courts’ decisions have 
resulted in a variety of holdings.180  If, however, courts routinely honor prior 
agreements, the time and costs associated with litigation over embryo disputes 
will decrease.181  Any concerns about strict enforcement would be unnecessary, 
as contract law allows courts to void cryopreservation agreements where cer-
tain standards are not met, namely in situations of fraud, mistake, or coer-
cion.182  Finally, due to the sensitive and significant issues involved, courts 
should approach agreements with greater skepticism before enforcing an agree-
ment against a donor who later changes his or her wishes.183 
 
 174. Robertson, supra note 6, at 415. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1084. 
 178. Meagan R. Marold, Ice, Ice, Baby! The Division of Frozen Embryos at the 
Time of Divorce, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 195 (2014); see also Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 
SCIENCE 453 (1981) (arguing that the framing of a decision and its consequences affects 
a person’s choice preferences). 
 179. See Marold, supra note 178, at 195. 
 180. Robertson, supra note 6, at 418. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981).  Contracts can also be deemed unenforceable in grounds of violation of public 
policy.  Petersen, supra note 173, at 1089 (“[T]he Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
provides for unenforceability on grounds of public policy, invalidation in accordance 
with this provision requires that the public policy interest clearly outweigh[s] the inter-
est in enforcing the contract terms.” (footnote omitted)). 
 183. See Sandra Kennedy, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Why States Should Adopt 
California’s Independent Counsel Requirement for the Enforceability of Prenuptial 
Agreements, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 709, 713 (2014). 
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B. Independent Counsel Should Be Required 
States should require parties to consult with independent counsel before 
a cryopreservation agreement is presumed enforceable.  Such a rule would pro-
vide, at a minimum, two benefits.  First, it would make parties more knowl-
edgeable and aware of their rights at stake.  A competent attorney can guide 
his or her clients away from potential problems that lead to litigation.  Second, 
even if a couple makes what some might see as an unfair agreement (e.g., 
awarding frozen embryos to the woman for gestation in the event of divorce), 
enforcing the couples’ contract is more justifiable knowing that the parties en-
tered into the contract after consultation with independent counsel.184 
Cryopreservation agreements, as with most contracts, can have a plethora 
of supplemental clauses, addendums, and technical terms.185  As one observer 
notes, “The presentation of the countless forms coupled with the contemplation 
of death and divorce in a time of supposed happiness for the parents-to-be, 
makes it nearly impossible to form a thoughtful and informed decision about . 
. . your embryos . . . in the event one of the contingencies should occur.”186  
Given the mix of emotions many experience at this time, each party should be 
required to seek counsel so that the serious and long-lasting consequences as-
sociated with the disposition of the embryos may be discussed. 
Consulting independent counsel has been mandated in other situations, 
such as prenuptial agreements.187  Historically, prenuptial agreements were 
presumed unenforceable because they were “contrary to the concept of mar-
riage.”188  As the country’s attitude and cultural values shifted, “paternalism 
demonstrated by earlier courts has decreased as overall enforceability [of pre-
nuptial agreements] has risen.”189  Although now presumably enforceable, pre-
nuptial agreements still adhere to traditional contract law.190  Agreements are  
 184. Essential to every contract is a “meeting of the minds,” also known as mutual 
assent.  See Richard Stim, Contracts: The Basics, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/contracts-basics-33367.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).  Key to mutual 
assent is a shared understanding of essential terms.  Id.  Consulting an attorney can 
ensure that donors understand and accept the key terms to a cryopreservation agree-
ment.  See id. 
 185. Marold, supra note 178, at 195–96. 
 186. Id. at 196. 
 187. “A prenuptial agreement (“prenup” for short) is a written contract created by 
two people before they are married.”  Prenuptial Agreements: Who Needs It and How 
Do I Make One?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agree-
ments-overview-29569.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).  “A prenup typically lists all 
of the property each person owns (as well as any debts) and specifies what each per-
son’s property rights will be after the marriage.”  Id.; see generally Allison A. Marston, 
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887 
(1997). 
 188. Marston, supra note 187, at 897 (“Until 1970, prenuptial agreements providing 
for the disposition of assets upon divorce were unenforceable in the United States.”). 
 189. Id. at 898. 
 190. Id. 
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enforceable only when entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and without duress 
or undue influence.191  Nonetheless, some prenuptial agreements are the result 
of last-minute decisions, and yet others reveal significant imbalances in the 
distribution of assets.192  In light of these increasingly common and unjust out-
comes, certain courts have required couples to seek independent counsel before 
entering into a prenuptial agreement.193  These courts maintain that couples 
entering into prenuptial contracts should be well informed of their rights, 
should understand the terms of the contract, and should be assured of the en-
forceability of their agreement so that future litigation is unlikely.194 
Similarly, cryopreservation agreements would benefit from an independ-
ent-counsel requirement.  Like a prenuptial agreement, frozen embryo con-
tracts deal with parties at a deeply-sensitive time in their lives.195  Further, both 
types of contracts – hopefully – reach parties when they are eager and excited 
for the future.  An independent-counsel requirement would ensure the parties 
have contemplated, or are at least knowledgeable of, the legal implications of 
their decisions.  Current cryopreservation case law is noticeably riddled with 
contractual disputes.  For example, one agreement provided for embryo dispo-
sition in the event of “separation,” but it did not specifically address “di-
vorce.”196  Another couple did not reach an agreement regarding embryo dis-
position in the case of divorce or separation, or even discuss the issues gener-
ally.197  Moreover, one man routinely signed cryopreservation forms in the car 
on the way to the fertility clinic before any details had been written down.198  
Instead of making rash decisions, an independent-counsel requirement would 
encourage “couples [to] make disposition decisions only after careful, compas-
sionate consideration of various circumstances that could arise and alter their 
situations.”199 
An independent-counsel requirement would benefit parties by allowing 
an attorney to anticipate potential legal issues and clarify each member’s rights 
at stake.  Furthermore, consultation with independent counsel can and should 
be a crucial factor in determining whether an apparent waiver of rights should 
be enforced.  A recurring example in case law features a cryopreservation con-
 
 191. Id. at 909–10. 
 192. Id. at 912–13; see also Rowland v. Rowland, 599 N.E.2d 315, 316–17 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1991) (finding a prenuptial agreement invalid where a man threatened to 
forego marrying his pregnant fiancé, who was not represented by independent counsel, 
if she did not waive her rights to alimony and property valued over $150,000.). 
 193. Kennedy, supra note 182, at 716–17. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1087–88. 
 196. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1054, 1057 (Mass. 2000). 
 197. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn. 1992). 
 198. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054. 
 199. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1088. 
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tract empowering a woman to implant frozen embryos should the couple di-
vorce or otherwise separate.200  If such an event occurs and the man no longer 
agrees with the contract’s terms, the court is left to decide whether to enforce 
the contract and allow the woman to use the frozen embryos against the man’s 
wishes.  Stated differently, the court must decide whether to force the man to 
procreate given the parties’ earlier contract.  The rights to procreate and not to 
procreate have been considered “a vital part of an individual’s right to privacy” 
and deemed “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”201  But, like most rights, the right not to procreate can be waived 
– as in this example, by contract.202  To enforce a waiver of such intimate rights, 
courts should require proof that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and 
with full knowledge of the affected rights.203  The best way to determine if the 
agreement was entered into voluntarily and with adequate knowledge is to ex-
amine whether the couple sought independent counsel before signing their 
agreement.204 
An independent-counsel requirement, although beneficial and important 
for multiple reasons, has downsides.  A requirement to consult counsel would 
undoubtedly add time to the already lengthy process of IVF.  Requiring inde-
pendent counsel for each cryopreservation contract would also increase 
costs.205  Legal fees can be a significant burden, especially when coupled with 
the costs of cryopreservation and the IVF procedure, which are typically sub-
stantial.206  But, legal fees would constitute only a small portion of the total 
cost of IVF procedures.  Further, as cryopreservation of embryos becomes 
more common, fertility clinics should develop standard form contracts to ex-
pedite and simplify the process of consulting an attorney, thus decreasing the 
associated costs. 
For some, adding an independent-counsel requirement does not remedy a 
contract’s failure to protect societal interests.207  For example, although pre-
nuptial agreements are presumed enforceable, any designation for child support 
is usually not honored due to the court’s and society’s independent interests in 
 
 200. See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015); 
see A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059; McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 145 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2016). 
 201. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599, 600 (second quotation quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 202. Robertson, supra note 6, at 422. 
 203. Id. at 423 (“With so much hinging on the options chosen, [fertility] programs 
should take great care to make sure that the couple is fully aware of the consequences 
of their choices and the alternatives foregone.”). 
 204. C.f. Kennedy, supra note 183, at 710 (demonstrating that in the context of 
prenuptial agreements the use of independent counsel has made some courts more 
likely to uphold an agreement challenged on voluntariness and knowingness). 
 205. C.f. Marston, supra note 187, at 893 (showing the high costs of retaining coun-
sel to draft prenuptial agreements). 
 206. Shields, supra note 80, at 696–709. 
 207. See Petersen, supra note 173, at 1086. 
23
El-Zein: Embry-Uh-Oh
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
904 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
a child’s well-being.208  The enforcement of agreements allowing a surrogate 
to carry a couple’s child for a fee has also been criticized for commodifying 
reproduction in a way that contradicts societal values.209  However, cryopres-
ervation agreements differ from prenuptial and surrogate contracts because 
designation of frozen embryo disposition does not deal with an exchange of 
money but rather “simply specif[ies] treatment of already created embryos.”210  
And while prenuptial and surrogate contracts could be considered commercial 
transactions, cryopreservation agreements – when created appropriately – are 
considerate of countless contingences and circumstances.  Undoubtedly, this is 
a complicated, sensitive, and intimate issue that is deeply personal.  In such 
situations, it may be impossible to honor both parties’ wishes and all of soci-
ety’s concerns. 
Jalesia McQueen and Justin Gadberry signed a cryopreservation contract 
but now disagree on most of the important details.  Had the couple consulted 
an attorney before signing the agreement, it may have been difficult for 
McQueen to add a clause to the contract without Gadberry’s knowledge, and it 
would be absurd for Gadberry to now claim that he was unaware of a crucial 
contractual provision.  Indeed, a quick meeting with independent counsel could 
have spared the couple from a lengthy, emotional lawsuit and saved the court 
from guessing as to the couple’s actual intentions.  Unfortunately, it was too 
late for McQueen and Gadberry to utilize an independent-counsel requirement, 
and their frozen embryos were left at the mercy of the court.  But, as a case of 
first impression, Missouri now has the opportunity to encourage consultation 
with independent counsel so that disputes are less likely to arise, or, if they do, 
courts can resolve issues quickly and confidently. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
At the writing of this Note, over 600,000 frozen embryos are in storage 
in the United States alone.211  Even if a mere fraction of these embryos produce 
a legal dispute, courts will need clear guidance to address the sensitive and 
intimate issues at stake.  A contractual approach, coupled with a requirement 
to consult independent counsel, will ensure that couples entering into a cryo-
preservation agreement understand the contract, its consequences, and their 
rights and potential obligations should death, divorce, or other changes in cir-
cumstance occur.  Although not a perfect solution, the heightened independent-
counsel requirement combined with more traditional rules of contract law will 
give courts the clearest path to honoring the parties’ original wishes. 
 
 
 208. Marston, supra note 187, at 898. 
 209. Petersen, supra note 173, at 1086–87. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See Embryo Adoption, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/opa/about-opa-and-initiatives/embryo-adoption/ (last visited Sept. 
8, 2017). 
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